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Home Country Institutions and the Internationalization of State Owned 
Enterprises: A Cross-Country Analysis 
 
Abstract 
National institutions shape the ability of civil society and minority shareholders to monitor and 
influence decision-makers in listed state owned enterprises (SOEs), and thereby their strategies of 
internationalization. We argue that the weaker are such controls, the more likely such decision makers 
pursue self-serving motives, and thus shy away from international investment. Listed SOEs’ strategies 
will thus be more similar to those of wholly privately owned enterprises (POEs) when these controls 
are more effective. Building on Williamson’s (2000) hierarchy of institutions, we examine how home 
country institutions exerting normative, regulatory, and governance-related controls affect the 
comparative internationalization levels of listed SOEs and POEs.  Based on a matched sample of 153 
majority state owned and 153 wholly privately owned listed firms from 40 different countries, we 
confirm that, when home country institutions enable effective control, the internationalization 
strategies of listed SOEs and POEs converge. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: state owned enterprises, internationalization, home country institutions, matched sample, 
Tobit regression.  
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Introduction 
State owned enterprises (SOEs) differ from wholly privately owned firms (POEs),
 1
 for example in 
terms of their governance (Gedaljovic & Shapiro, 1998; Rodriguez et al., 2007); attitude to risk 
(Borisova et al, 2012; Garcia-Canal & Guillén, 2008); and access to resources (Morck et al., 2008; 
Wang, et al. 2012c). Yet, despite the increasing global role of SOEs (UNCTAD 2014; Bruton et al., 
2015), the impact of the state as an owner on firms’ internationalization remains underexplored. 
We start from the proposition that the processes owners use to shape the strategies of their firms 
depend upon the institutional framework under which they operate. Hence, even firms with similar 
types of ownership may make different strategic choices when institutional contexts vary (Peng, et al., 
2008; Xu & Meyer, 2013). Yet, how specific institutions affect the behavior of particular types of 
firms remains an insufficiently understood question in strategic management research (Bruton, et al., 
2010; Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Murtha & Lenway, 1994; Peng, et al., 2008). We follow Williamson 
(2000: 608) in arguing that “ownership is not determinative but needs to be examined in conjunction 
with the support, or the lack thereof, of the mechanisms of governance”.  Our research question is 
therefore: Under what conditions – in terms of home country institutions – do state owners facilitate 
or constrain corporate strategies of internationalization?  
POEs are generally presumed to prioritize profit oriented motives such as shareholder wealth 
maximization. They invest overseas when international investments are expected to be in the long run 
more profitable than domestic alternatives (Dunning, 1993). On the other hand, fully state owned 
organizations, such as government departments, follow primarily political agendas. Our interest 
focuses on companies with a mixed ownership structure – an increasingly important phenomenon in 
international business (Bruton et al., 2015). If a state entity controls a majority (more than 50%) of the 
quoted equity, it has a decisive voice in company decision-making, and the firm qualifies as a “listed 
state owned enterprise” (listed SOE). Then it is subject to political as well as business interests, 
potentially faces  principal-principal conflicts (Lubatkin et al., 2005; Young et al., 2008), and is likely 
                                                          
1
 We use this abbreviation strictly for wholly privately owned firms, namely firms without any state entity as an 
investor. 
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to pursue a wider range of corporate objectives (Benito et al., 2011; Estrin & Perotin, 1991). We thus 
compare the strategies of POEs  without any state-ownership and listed SOEs. We do not consider and 
exclude from our empirical analysis firms with minority equity stakes held by the state.  
Our theoretical lens is the institution-based view, which investigates how rules and regulations 
govern decision makers in businesses, and thereby influence firms’ strategies (Peng et al., 2008; 
Kostova et al., 2008; Meyer & Peng, 2016). While researchers have recognized the importance of 
both home and host country institutions for international strategies, most empirical work has focused 
on host country characteristics (e.g., Delios & Henisz, 2003; Meyer et al., 2014) or the distance 
between home and host countries (e.g., Estrin et al., 2009a, Tihanyi et al., 2005). In contrast, the 
influence of home country institutions has been largely neglected (Henisz & Zelner, 2010; Morck et 
al., 2008).  
We use Williamson’s (2000) synthesis of ‘new institutional economics’ to explore the impact of 
home country institutions; he identifies institutions at three levels that shape managerial decision-
making. These home country institutions moderate the direct impact of state ownership on 
internationalization, which may be positive or negative. We argue that the greater the extent to which 
decision makers in SOEs are subject to effective control through the institutional structure, the less 
SOEs are likely to deviate from profit-oriented motives. When controls through institutional structures 
are weak however, ‘insiders’ such as politicians, lobbyists and SOE decision makers and managers 
are more able to pursue personal goals, for example providing benefits for their supporters or 
extracting private rents (Faccio, 2006; Goldeng et al., 2008; Shleifer & Vishny 1994). These rents are 
normally (though not exclusively) identified and extracted domestically. However, the stronger are 
the institutional controls over these SOE insiders, the more SOE internationalization strategies will 
resemble those of POEs.  
Our empirical analysis tests these predictions using a matched sample methodology (Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002). Starting from a dataset comprising the World’s 5000 largest listed firms, we identified 
all SOEs (of which there were 153), and then matched them with 153 POEs in the same dataset. We 
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find that the internationalization of SOEs is conditioned by the effectiveness of institutions at each of 
the three levels of the institutional hierarchy in constraining opportunistic behaviors. 
We contribute to the management literature by advancing the institutional perspective to examine 
the acknowledged yet rarely systematically investigated relationship between home country 
institutions and MNE strategies (Meyer & Thein, 2014; Morck et al., 2008; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2010). 
Second, we extend the institutional perspective (Bruton et al., 2010; Peng et al., 2008; Khanna & 
Rivkin, 2001; Henisz & Zelner, 2010) by exploring how institutions affect  an increasingly significant 
form of ownership, namely state ownership of listed firms (Bruton et al., 2015). To this end, we 
develop a theoretical framework of the interaction between national institutions and the strategies of 
SOEs. Third, we are one of the first  to investigate how national context moderates the effects of 
ownership on firm internationalization strategies. While earlier studies suggest that ownership directly 
influences  internationalization (Tihanyi, et al., 2003; Cui & Jiang, 2012; Garcia-Canal & Guillén, 
2008), our empirical results show how this impact is conditioned by the institutional environment.  
State Owners, Institutions and Internationalization  
State Ownership 
In this study, we follow Bruton et al. (2015) and study hybrid organizational forms; in particular listed 
SOEs, the majority ownership of which is in the hands of the state.
2
  Such firms are estimated to own 
around 20% of the world’s stock market capitalization (Economist, 2010) and hence play a growing 
role in both domestic and global business. Recent scholarly interest has been stimulated by the surge 
of Chinese SOEs becoming major international players in some industries (Chen & Young, 2010; Cui 
& Jiang, 2012; Morck et al., 2008; Ramasamy et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2012b; c). However, listed 
SOEs are a much wider phenomenon: they are common in many emerging economies, and play 
important niche roles in several West European countries (Goldeng et al., 2008; Knutsen, Rygh & 
Hvem, 2011). To explore how this important type of ownership interacts with home country contexts 
to influence internationalization, we first discuss the theoretical mechanisms by which ownership 
                                                          
2
 The state owns or runs many other organizations integrated into the state apparatus e.g. the courts, the 
police or the army, but these are neither commercial nor distinct from organs of the state apparatus. 
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impacts internationalization, before turning to the moderating role of institutions, our main interest in 
this study.  
Ownership and Governance 
Private firms focus on creating wealth by developing and exploiting strategic advantages in 
potentially profitable locations. The theory of the MNE suggests such potentially profitable 
opportunities to be associated with firm’s possession of internationally transferable resources, also 
known as ownership advantages (Dunning, 1993) or firm-specific assets (Rugman, 1980). Such firm-
specific advantages enable firms to sell in foreign markets by helping to overcome the liability of 
foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). When such resources can best be exploited internally rather than by arms’ 
length transactions, firms establish subsidiaries abroad, rather than export or license their assets 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976). Resources that can be exploited internationally through direct investment 
include in particular technology and marketing related assets (Hitt et al., 2006; Kirca et al., 2010; 
2012).  
However, owners and management boards vary in their support for internationalization (Tihanyi, 
et al., 2003). There are three mechanisms through which the owners create incentives to invest 
internationally: (1) they set objectives, (2) they shape the governance structure, and (3) they appoint 
management teams that eventually design and implement their strategies.  
The primary objective of POEs is the maximization of profits. However, state owners may 
introduce  non-commercial motives into firm objectives (Estrin & Perotin, 1991).
3
 Governments can 
use SOEs to achieve a variety of desired policy outcomes. In a free market economy, SOEs tend to be 
restricted to specific areas where pure market outcomes are considered either inefficient or socially 
undesirable (Vickers and Yarrow, 1992), such as industries with natural monopolies or providing a 
socially-desired basic service. In other countries, the state plays a direct role in economic 
development, and strategically deploys SOEs to achieve such political objectives (Aharoni 1981; Li, 
Cui, & Lu, 2014; Wang et al., 2012b). In this view, state ownership addresses the market failures of 
                                                          
3
 Given our focus on listed firms it seems reasonable to assume owners’ attention to profit and share-holder 
wealth maximization. Nevertheless, we recognize that privately owned firms may also pursue non-profit 
related motives, including social goals such as triple bottom line. We thank an anonymous reviewer for 
reminding us of this. 
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under-development by enabling funding of key industrialization or infrastructure projects (George & 
Prabhu, 2000), or even by guiding the process of market driven economic development, as is the case 
in Singapore and China (Redding & Witt, 2009; Tipton, 2009).  
The objectives of resolving market failure or promoting economic development both normally 
entail investments in the home economy; though development may be complementary with 
internationalization. However, apart from this and other special cases such as natural resource 
industries, the additional objectives for firms introduced by state-owners would reduce their 
propensity to invest overseas.   
SOEs are also necessarily subject to more complex governance structures than POEs, which can 
create dysfunctional incentives for decision makers in SOEs. In particular, SOEs are subject to two 
mutually reinforcing agency conflicts; the first between the public and the government, and the 
second between the government and the SOE management (Rodriguez et al., 2007). Hence, elites in 
some countries can exploit these complexities  in the governance of SOEs so as to divert resources for 
their own purposes, including for the extraction of rents (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Such 
extractable rents are fostered for example by the dominant positions held by some SOEs within the 
domestic economy, and by domestic institutions providing them some degree of protection from 
competition and monitoring. For example, SOEs may create or maintain employment among 
politically influential groups, such as voters in critical political constituencies. Under such a scenario, 
the dual agency conflict in SOEs leads them to divert resources and rents into the hands of powerful 
insiders.  
When state-ownership is mixed with private ownership in hybrid organizations such as listed 
SOEs, while the dual agency conflict may be reduced by the influence of minority private 
shareholders, , a principal-principal conflict may emerge because private and state owners may pursue 
different objectives (Young et al., 2008). For example, the state may seek to create jobs in key 
political regions, or to hold down the prices of goods that have a significant effect on the budgets of 
political supporters, in direct conflict with the profit objective of private owners. Decision makers are 
left to resolve irreconcilable differences in objectives, and in practice some may be tempted to exploit 
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the conflict to their private benefit for example via rent seeking (Estrin and Perotin, 1991).Because 
conflicting objectives make it harder for the owners to specify targets and to monitor performance, 
this provides leeway for decision makers to pursue their personal gains. The mechanisms whereby 
company insiders can exploit these agency conflicts for private gainwill be located primarily, though 
not exclusively, in the domestic economy. 
 The pattern of rent generation in the domestic economy has often been carefully constructed and 
protected by policy and regulation in favor of rent-seekers (Applebaum & Katz, 1987). Such 
mechanisms of rent appropriation are typically much harder to replicate in international activities than 
at home. For example, firms operating abroad will be subject to monitoring and control from local and 
international stakeholders, such as media (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003, Jensen, 2003; Meyer et al. 
2014). Moreover, in host countries with less transparent monitoring, foreign SOEs would often lack 
the sorts of relationships or ties with local elites and networks that provide an important mechanism 
for rent extraction. We therefore conclude that decision makers in SOEs who are enabled to pursue 
private gain without being held adequately accountable to their owners are likely to exhibit a home 
country bias. 
Third, owners appoint management teams that make key strategic decisions and implement 
strategies on their behalf. Research has shown that the demographic and team characteristics of top 
management teams influence firms’ internationalization strategies (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2011). In 
particular, the international experience of managers is strongly associated with internationalization 
strategies (Sambharya, 1996; Tan & Meyer, 2010). Through the selection of individuals for leadership 
roles in a company, owners intentionally or unintentionally shape the firms’ strategies.  For example, 
where leaders of state enterprises are selected based on political criteria or as part of national political 
cadre development (as in China, see Brødsgaard, 2012) rather than their international business 
experience, these managers are likely to prioritize operating where they know the environment best, 
namely in the domestic market. Government entities as owners selecting managers on the basis of 
political capital are therefore likely to select leaders who are less inclined to internationalize.     
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The essence of these three arguments is that state ownership introduces the possibility of diversion 
of company resources from outcomes that would pertain under private ownership;, introducing a bias 
in favor of domestic over overseas investments. The scale of this  bias depends on the national 
institutions that constrain the power of managers relative to owners, and of the state relative to 
minority private shareholders. The more effectively that decision makers in SOEs are subject to 
monitoring and control, the more they will act similarly to private enterprises in a given situation. 
Specifically, strong controls will limit the ability of representatives of the state to impose objectives 
upon the SOE that (1) deviate from the interests of minority shareholders; (2) limit the ability of 
managers to exploit principal-principal conflicts to their own benefits; and (3) ensure that managerial 
qualifications rather than political alignment drive the selection of top management teams. If, on the 
other hand, institutional control mechanisms are weak, strategies of listed SOEs and POEs with 
respect for example to internationalization will diverge; SOE managers will use their insider power to 
pursue personal objectives to the detriment of profitability, such as displaying a home country bias.   
Institutions and SOEs 
To analyze the institutions that may constrain insiders from diverting companies’ resources, we turn 
to the institutional perspective. Institutions as rules of the game are shaping the extent of agency 
conflict and the efficiency of governance structures and thus the mechanisms by which owners can 
influence the activities of firms (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Estrin & Prevezer, 2011; Filatotchev, 
Jackson & Nakajima, 2013; Wiseman, Cuervas-Rodgriguez & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). Specifically, 
they shape the functioning of organizational hierarchies in both public and private sector 
organizations by creating the incentives faced by decision makers, which in turn vary between firms 
according to ownership structures. 
To organize a wide range of possible rules, Williamson (2000) analyzes institutional systems by 
distinguishing institutions at three levels by the pace at which they change. Each level of institutions 
places constraints on the ones below and jointly they determine national and organizational resource 
allocation. What North (1990) terms informal institutions, that is the customs, cultural traditions and 
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religious norms underpinning a society, are seen as the deepest rooted and slowest changing 
institutions and therefore placed at the apex of Williamson’s hierarchy.  
At the second level are formal institutions; the codified rules that for example define property 
rights and ownership arrangements, and which are stable and effectively enforced. The third level, 
governance, represents the particular structures adopted by organizations and individuals to manage 
transactions. Institutions at all three levels affect corporate resource allocations to international 
operations by establishing constraints on company decision makers.  
These three levels of institutions are closely inter-related. Thus, formal institutions are embedded 
in cultural settings because political, economic, and contractual rules are connected to peoples’ 
perceptions of how things ought to be done. Culture is the “software of the mind” (Hofstede, 1991) 
and formal institutions are themselves “products of the dominant cultural value systems” (Hofstede, 
2001: 34). As a result, the same formal institutions that exist in societies with different cultural values 
can produce different economic outcomes (North, 1990). Likewise, governance mechanisms are 
shaped by the law, while emergent governance practices over longer time periods become codified 
into legal documents. However, change is slower at higher than lower levels of institutions.  
Institutions at all three levels jointly determine a firm’ s allocation of resources because they shape 
incentives for decision makers and hence their resource allocation decisions (Williamson, 2000). An 
important example of this principle concerns firm internationalization; institutions shape outward 
investment in firms because they set the incentives under which business leaders allocate resources to 
foreign operation (Buckley et al., 2007; Morck et al., 2008). In a firm with both state and private 
owners, such institutions influence to what extent insiders representing the state owners are subject to 
effective monitoring and control, and hence can freely implement self-serving strategies that deviate 
from those of the private shareholders. Generally, where institutions impose only weak controls, listed 
SOEs would pay more attention to insider-promoted objectives that are likely to be more domestically 
focused. Consequently, interactions between ownership structure and institutions determine listed 
SOEs’ allocation of resources to international operations.  
Hypothesis Development: Home Country Institutions  
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As argued above, our baseline assumption is that if appropriate incentives are provided, listed SOEs 
will make similar choices to those of listed POEs. In particular, they will similarly exploit their firm-
specific advantages by internationalization However, when institutional controls are weak or 
inadequate, listed SOEs’ behavior will deviate from the strategies of POEs in a numbers of ways, 
notably through domestic rent seeking and hence the adoption of more domestically oriented 
strategies. Hence, the direct effect of state ownership on internationalization is subject to opposing 
forces, and may be positive or negative depending on the institutional environment.  
Our hypothesis development explores the ways in which home country institutions, developed 
around the three levels proposed by Williamson (2000), moderate the relationship between state 
ownership of firms and internationalization. We commence with the highest level - informal 
institutions - before considering formal and governance institutions. 
Informal Institutions: Normative Control 
The highest and most stable level of institutions in Williamson’s (2000) framework is informal 
institutions. According to North (1990: 37), these represent “the cultural filter that provides continuity 
so that the informal solution to exchange problems in the past carries over into the present and makes 
those informal constraints important sources of continuity in long-run societal change”. Informal 
constraints are culturally-grounded and can thus not be changed through deliberate policies but are 
passed from one generation to the next and only change gradually in that process (Hofstede, 1991; 
2001). They have an enduring impact on executive mindsets (Geletkanycz, 1997) and interpretation 
and response to strategic issues (Schneider & DeMeyer, 1991; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013).  
Informal institutions shape the ability of a society to monitor and control the state sector, including 
both political actors and decision makers in SOEs. When the authority of these elites is unconstrained 
by norms of control, they are more able to pursue self-serving objectives. Such informal, or 
normative, control arises in situations when societal norms enable individuals of lower status to raise 
grievances or complaints against those of higher status, with the normative expectation that such 
grievances or complaints will directly or indirectly influence those of higher status. Informal 
12 
 
 
institution of control over persons in authority can operate for example via the media, the internet, or 
elected representatives that hold the elites in the state sector accountable.  
Informal institutions of control are inversely related to power distance, which refers to “the extent 
to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions … accept and expect that power 
is distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 1991:28). This, therefore, reflects the degree to which 
relationships of power, status and hierarchy are considered legitimate in a society. Thus, in high 
power distance societies, class divisions are typical, leading to the concentration of power and 
authority among select (elite) groups (Hofstede, 1980). In contrast, informal institutions of control are 
associated with challenges to power and status being considered legitimate; hence those in positions 
of authority can expect to be challenged, and especially so if they abuse their power.  
The implications of this legitimacy of challenges to authority have been highlighted in studies of 
the impact of power distance on management practices. First, low power distance is associated with 
decentralized decision making and less authoritative leadership (Newman & Nollen, 1996) and with 
more ambiguous roles and responsibilities (Kirkman & Shapiro 1997). Consequently, the 
effectiveness of practices such as work involvement varies with power distance: in high power 
distance countries employees follow instrumental incentives, whereas symbolic values are more 
important to motivate employees in low power distance countries (Jiang et al., 2015). Second, low 
power distance facilitates the flow of ideas and innovations between ordinary staff members and top 
management and increases managerial attention to external cues, which in turn facilitates 
organizational responsiveness to the recognition of international opportunities (Geletkanycz, 1997; 
Levy, 2005). Hence, individuals of lower status have more opportunities to monitor and influence 
decision making with lower power distance.  
These insights into the influence of national culture on organizations suggest two consequences. 
First, in societies with strong informal institutions of control, people in high status roles, such as listed 
SOE managers and associated elites, are more likely to be challenged within their organizations and 
by society as a whole. This will be especially true if they pursue private benefit at the expense of 
public interest. Thus, strong informal control norms create pressures for elites to justify their actions, 
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and reduce their ability to pursue personal agendas. Indeed, evidence suggests that low power distance 
countries are associated with less politico-social corruption (Basabe & Ros, 2005). 
Second, when informal control norms are weak, the ambiguities of power structures, which tend to 
occur in listed SOEs because of principal-principal conflicts, are more likely to undermine the 
effectiveness of investment decisions. Thus, the importance of informal norms of control is not the 
same in listed SOEs and POEs: managers in POEs are aligned to owners’ objectives through formal 
governance mechanisms such as stock market monitoring and share options and are more incentivized 
to eschew rent extracting activities.  Moreover, the absence of principal-principal conflicts between 
the state and private owners reduces the possibilities for POE managers to exploit such conflicts. 
Hence, because of  their more clearly defined governance structures, normative controls play a less 
important role in POEs.  
In contrast, decision makers in listed SOEs face less clearly defined governance structures due to 
the extensive principal-agent and principal-principal conflicts noted above. With formal 
organizational structures vaguely defined, informal norms become more important (Peng et al. 2008). 
Hence, informal norms that give legitimacy to lower ranked members of a society, for example to 
challenge authority, are more important for the governance of listed SOEs compared to POEs. Listed 
SOEs operating within weak informal norms of control are more able and likely to use their power to 
pursue private benefits, opportunities for which mainly arise in the domestic context where they may 
enjoy preferential government relationships and protection. Hence, we expect lSOEs in contexts with 
strong informal institutions of control – the norms governing behaviors of persons in roles of authority 
– to invest relatively more into international operations: 
H1: Stronger informal institutions of control will have a positive effect on (strengthen) the 
relationship between state ownership and internationalization. 
 
Formal institutions: Regulatory control 
At the second level of Williamson’s (2000) hierarchy of institutions stand formal institutions. Formal 
institutions are the foundation for the efficiency of markets as they enable for the exchange of 
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information among actors, the monitoring of behavior, and the sanctioning of defection from 
cooperative endeavor (North, 1990; Olson 1996). Conversely, weaknesses of formal institutions such 
as property rights and rules of law are weak are often seen as primary cause of the persistence of 
institutional voids in emerging economies (Khanna & Palepu, 2000). Some of the voids thus created 
may be filled by SOEs (Estrin et al., 2009b; Vickers & Yarrow, 1992). The objectives of state 
ownership in such cases are, however, typically domestic, and hence lead us to expect less 
internationalization of operations than under wholly private ownership.  
Moreover, a weak legal framework reduces the constraints on the pursuit of self-serving 
objectives, and increases the ability of insiders to exploit resources of SOEs for their own benefit. For 
example, weakly defined and enforced property rights make it easier for insiders to expropriate state 
owned assets for the private purposes of politicians or SOE managers (Friedman et al., 2003; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 2002). Similarly, in regimes of weak competition law, a small number of incumbent 
monopolies with strong political ties may benefit from protection such as import restrictions (Hillman 
& Hitt, 1999). At the same time, a weak rule of law is associated with higher levels of corruption, 
which tends to favor local firms vis-à-vis foreign investors (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002) and incumbent 
firms such as SOEs over start-ups (Bruno et al., 2013).  
When formal institutions are weak, non-market capabilities, such as lobbying and government 
relationships, become more useful to firms because the government’s role in the economy increases 
and performance becomes more reliant on government favors (Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Vishny & 
Shleifer, 1994. However, SOEs are in a better position to benefit from investment in such non-market 
capabilities, because they are more closely integrated with the political elite, though spending 
resources in this way holds their internationalization back relative to private firms (Boddewyn & 
Brewer, 1994). Their relative domestic advantages likely have developed in response to local 
regulations and policies (Applebaum & Katz, 1987) and cannot be easily leveraged into foreign 
markets. Especially SOEs that dominate their home market on the basis of institution-based 
competitive advantages will find it difficult to transfer these advantages to foreign countries.  
15 
 
 
In contrast, when formal institutions are well formulated and enforced, listed SOEs are subject to 
controls as specified in rules and regulation, in the same way as POEs. Specifically, equal treatment 
before consistently enforced laws disables some of the practices that give SOEs a competitive edge in 
certain home environments. Consequently, when controls through the legal system are strong, listed 
SOEs face institutional constraints more similar to POEs, and hence are likely to act more like POEs 
both at home and in their internationalization strategies. Hence, the better rules of law are formulated 
and enforced, the less that SOEs can exploit domestic regulatory gaps, and the more they resemble 
private firms in their international investment strategies:   
H2: Stronger formal institutions of control will have a positive effect on (strengthen) the 
relationship between state ownership and internationalization. 
 
Corporate governance institutions: Capital market controls 
The third level of Williamson’s hierarchy is governance, which include rules and regulations created 
by participants in the economy, such as business associations, private market regulation and the 
businesses themselves. Of these, the depth, liquidity and effectiveness of domestic capital markets 
arguably have the most significant impact on the behavior of firms. Capital markets serve both as 
benchmarks to assess corporate performance and as the basis for incentive schemes such as stock 
option plans that help in aligning managerial objectives with those of private investors (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). Hence, they address some of the agency problems that 
may lead listed SOEs to deviate from focusing on profits.  
The literature identifies several benefits of capital market development for firm governance and 
performance. Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that financial development reduces firms’ cost of 
external finance and promotes growth, while Levine and Zervos (1998) show that stock market 
liquidity and banking development positively impact on firms’ growth, capital accumulation, and 
productivity improvements. The main mechanisms for these improvements relate to the way that 
stronger capital markets bring competitive market pressures to bear to address agency problems 
internal to firms (Estrin and Perotin, 1991). Thus, in more developed capital markets, share price 
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information contains more accurate signals about comparative managerial performance, which can be 
used to evaluate managers in a particular company relative to counterparts in comparable 
organizations. Hence, stock market analysts can monitor managerial performance and more easily 
identify deviations from wealth creating behavior. More developed capital markets also support the 
market for corporate control, one of the key governance mechanisms in a market economy (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1998), and thus help address the agency problems by creating competition between 
managerial teams (Estrin et al, 2009b).  
Listed SOEs are hybrid organizations with private minority shareholders. Relative to POEs, they 
face both principal-principal problems and agency difficulties between owners and managers. 
However, the impact of both can be reduced in more efficient capital markets via the above 
mechanisms. Thus, because listed SOEs are subject to the governance systems of both the state sector 
and the private capital market because private shareholders can act as a ‘check’ on state-appointed 
individuals (Dharwadkar, George & Brandes, 2000; Young et al., 2008). Yet, their ability to do so 
depends on the development and effectiveness of capital market institutions. For example, when 
capital market institutions require clear reporting requirements, minority shareholders can monitor 
managerial performance more effectively. Hence listed SOE decision makers’ pursuit of self-serving 
objectives become harder to conceal or implement. Moreover, with the increased transparency 
provided by advanced capital markets, listed SOEs are more likely to be performance benchmarked 
against private firms, which provides incentives to emulate their strategies (Estrin et al., 2009b). 
Improved governance institutions thus will lead the strategies of SOEs and private firms to become 
increasingly alike (Chen & Young, 2010; Wang et al, 2012a). 
The managerial market is an important mechanism driving the incentive effects from capital 
markets to managerial behaviour. Managers’ careers may involve shifts in jobs between state owned 
and private firms as capital markets become more developed and the two sectors begin to converge. 
When listed SOEs operate in an isolated bubble, behind opaque information and reporting 
arrangements, managers’ incentives relatively favor the pursuit of private benefits. However, if 
information about their behavior is expensive to gather and evaluate, then the gains from rent taking  
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are higher and the risks of punishment are lower. As capital markets develop, the requirements to 
provide information and the ability to evaluate it through benchmarking rise. Thus, managers 
diverting resources for private benefit will be penalized by capital markets through a lower evaluation 
of their managerial performance reducing their prospect for advancement through the managerial 
labor market.    
Hence, institutions of governance constrain the personal objectives that politicians or SOE 
managers may pursue at the expense of minority shareholders. Those constraints are tighter when 
capital markets are mere developed, leading listed SOEs to act more like comparable POEs, for 
example with respect to internationalization. This effect is reinforced by the generation of resources 
with more developed capital markets. When capital markets are underdeveloped, firms must rely 
disproportionately on internally generated funds, which may be insufficient to support expensive 
internationalization strategies. As capital markets become more developed, they become deeper and 
more liquid, providing access to additional capital resources for firms at lower cost. This relaxation of 
the financial constraints on investment, including international investment provides a second reason 
for the development of governance institutions to increase the propensity of listed SOEs to 
internationalize relative to private firms: 
H3: Higher levels of corporate governance control will have a positive effect on 
(strengthen) the relationship between state ownership and internationalization.  
 
To sum up, we propose that the allocation of resources by listed SOEs to international operations is 
moderated by the configuration of institutions in the country from which they originate. In particular, 
we argue that institutions shape the incentives for managers who allocate resources, and hence 
influence the extent to which listed SOEs differ in their international investments from POEs. Our 
central proposition is that where institutions provide little control over insiders leading listed SOEs, 
they will be less internationalized than POEs. Yet, the more that institutions enable such control, the 
less the difference, and hence the more internationalized will be listed SOEs.  
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We test this proposition through three hypotheses motivated by Williamson’s (2000) hierarchy of 
institutions. Societies characterized by informal institutions enabling strong normative control (H1), 
formal institutions securing effective legal control law (H2) and governance institutions enabling 
capital market control (H3) moderate the effect of state ownership on internationalization. While 
theory tells us that the institutions at each level are highly correlated, they have different implications 
for policy and managerial practice. Figure 1 below shows the conceptual model upon which our 
empirical analyses are conducted.   
*** Insert Figure 1 here *** 
Methodology  
Sample and data 
The initial sample for this study was drawn from the Worldscope database and includes the world’s 
5000 largest firms based on sales in 2010. This sampling was purposeful as we sought to include all 
large publicly listed enterprises (regardless of ownership) in order to ensure a comprehensive but 
representative population of firms from a variety of countries and industries with both private and 
public ownership structures in order to maximize variability in our data. Thomson One Banker was 
the source for firm level data, except for the ownership data, which came from the Orbis database. 
Country level data was obtained from the World Bank and Hofstede (1980; 2001). This dataset 
contained 153 state-owned enterprises
4
, defined as entities where the state has a majority ownership 
stake i.e. more than 50% of equity were held directly or indirectly by a state entity. Thus, given the 
relatively small subsample of SOEs and the potentially idiosyncratic nature of such firms, we created 
a matched sample of 153 wholly privately owned firms (POEs).
 
We used the propensity-score 
matching in order to ensure that SOEs and POEs were as similar as possible with regards to a number 
of observable characteristics. Specifically, we matched each treatment firm (i.e. SOE) with a control 
firm (i.e. POE) based on firm size (total sales) and industry affiliation (3-digit SIC). We performed 
matching without replacement on the basis of the propensity score (for more details on this method, 
see Dehejia and Wahba, 2002), which is estimated using a probit regression where the dependent 
                                                          
4
 We triangulated data from Thompson and Orbis databases to identify listed firms with more than 50% state 
ownership. In addition, we consulted the 2010 annual reports to ensure validity. 
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variable is the treatment dummy and the controls were the above mentioned variables. Our final 
dataset thus contains 153 listed SOEs and 153 POEs all of which are publicly listed (Table 1). The 
matching enables us to minimize the structural differences between lSOEs and POEs that exist in 
particular with respect to the industries within which they operate (UNCTAD, 2013). Other variations 
are controlled for in the conventional way by introducing control variables in the regression analysis.  
*** Table 1 about here *** 
Variables and measures 
The dependent variable, firm degree of internationalization was measured as foreign assets to total 
assets (FATA) (Kwok & Reeb, 2000), as we are primarily interested in the allocation of resources to 
international operations, and hence foreign direct investments. Our focal moderating variables are 
measured as follows: informal institutions of control (Hypothesis 1) was operationalized by the 
inverse of Hofstede’s power distance score (1991; 2001).5 Formal institutions of control (Hypothesis 
2) were measured by the rule of law index of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, 
Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010). Rule of law encompasses factors related to contract enforcement and the 
protection of property rights. Finally, governance institutions (Hypothesis 3) were proxied by the 
value of the capital market, proxied by market capitalization adjusted for size of the economy. We 
follow standard practice in therefore defining market capitalization  the sum of quoted share prices 
times the number of shares outstanding on the market normalized by  GDP. Market capitalization is 
the most commonly used proxy for institutional development of capital markets (World Bank, 2010). 
SOE is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm is a listed state owned by the above 
mentioned definition, and zero otherwise. In robustness tests we also explored the impact of allowing 
a continuous measure of state ownership among listed firms, and found substantively the same results. 
Control variables  
Following previous studies, we included a number of country, industry and firm-level variables as 
controls. First, we controlled for two aspects of the home economy that may influence firm  
internationalization, namely the country’s economic development in terms of GDP per capita (Delios 
                                                          
5
 Since the power distance scores (PD) are in the range between zero and 120, we defined normative control as 
120-PD. 
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& Henisz, 2003; Stoian, 2013) and its currency reserves (Goh & Wong, 2011). Currency reserves is 
the total reserves, including holdings of monetary gold, special drawing rights, reserves of IMF 
members held by the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities 
(World Bank, 2010). Next, we included industry level control variables, measured based on 3-digit 
SIC codes, to capture industry characteristics influencing firm internationalization (UNCTAD, 2013; 
Wiersema & Bowen, 2011). Industry concentration is an indication of the number and relative power 
of firms in an industry. It was measured as the percentage of sales accounted for by the top four firms 
within a global industry. Industry growth was measured as the annual compound growth rate, 
calculated by taking the 10
th
 root of the total percentage growth rate over a ten year period for the 
global industry (Dean & Meyer, 1996). We also controlled for resource-based industries, 
operationalized as a dummy variable for industries with SIC codes smaller than 1500. 
As firm level controls, product diversification was measured using the entropy measure of firm 
diversification (Hoskisson et al., 1993; Palepu 1985). The entropy values were calculated with the 
formula Σ pi ln(1/pi) where P is the percentage of segment sales of the total firm sales and (1/P) is used 
as a weight to account for the importance of each business segment. We moreover controlled for firm 
size, measured as the logarithm of the firm’s assets, and for firm age, measured as 2010 minus the 
year of foundation. As the firm’s own resources and capabilities constitutes a key driver of 
internationalization (Kirca et al., 2012), we also included R&D intensity, measured as R&D 
expenditures as a percentage of sales, in the analysis. However, since this variable was missing for a 
relatively large proportion of the sample, we followed prior research (e.g.  Singh, 2008) and coded all 
missing values of R&D with 0 and also added a dummy R&D presence indicating whether data on 
R&D was available or not. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) and correlations between 
the variables in our regression analysis. Not surprisingly, the rule of law is correlated with both power 
distance (.83) and GDP per capita (.83). Therefore, we conducted variance inflation factor (VIF) 
analyses to assess multicollinearity. The analyses generated 7.50 as a highest value, which is below 
the recommended benchmark of 10 (Hair et al., 1995).  
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*** Table 2 about here *** 
Analysis 
Given the nature of our sampling, our dependent variable (degree of internationalization) is subject to 
left-censoring. Some of the world’s largest firms are purely domestic and thus have zero degree of 
internationalization. Therefore, we used a Tobit (Tobin, 1958) model to estimate our equations while 
accounting for the left-censoring of our data. Conventional regression techniques, like OLS, can 
provide inconsistent parameter estimates when applied to data that include a large proportion of limit 
observations; it may yield a downwards-biased estimate of the slope coefficient and an upwards-
biased estimate of the intercept (Greene, 2003: 764).  
Results 
Table 3 provides our main results of the Tobit estimations. Model 1 shows the base equation with all 
the control variables. Models 2 to 7 report the analyses for each of our moderating variables; first we 
report the main effect model followed by the interaction effect as recommended by Andersson, 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Nielsen (2014). While inclusion of all interaction effects in the same model 
would have been preferable, particularly the rule of law variable is relatively highly correlated with 
the other institutional variables thus rendering such analyses problematic. It should be noted, 
however, that the results of the other two moderator variables (informal institutions and governance 
institutions) remained significant. The interdependency among the three types of institutions is 
consistent with the theory as outlined by Williamson (2000), suggesting an embedded and inter-
related hierarchy among institutions.  
*** Table 3 about here*** 
In models 2 and 3, we introduce informal institutions of control. While the main effect (Model 2) is 
not significant, we find support for hypothesis 1 in Model 3 that informal institutions of control has a 
positive significant moderating effect on the proclivity of SOEs to internationalize (β=0.58, p<0.05). 
This supports our argument that in countries with high normative control over persons in high 
authority roles, lSOEs are more internationalized compared to POEs. The fact that the main effect in 
model 2 is not significant underscores our theoretical argument; it is not that informal institutions of 
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control per se influences firm internationalization; however, when combined with a particular 
ownership type (lSOE versus POE) it may induce lSOEs to invest abroad. 
Hypothesis 2, which proposed a positive moderation of formal institutions of control on the focal 
relationship, also received strong support (β=0.14, p<0.01) (Model 5), suggesting that the strength of 
rule of law increases the degree of listed SOE internationalization. Finally, Hypothesis 3 predicted a 
positive moderation of corporate governance institutions in form of governance control on the state-
ownership-internationalization relationship. This hypothesis also obtained strong support (β=0.13, 
p<0.01) (Model 7) in favor of our theory. Together, the results provide strong evidence for our 
theoretical framework as outlined in Figure 1; listed SOE internationalization is conditioned in 
important ways by the configurations of informal, formal and governance institutions of the countries 
from which these listed SOEs originate.  
With respect to control variables, we detect positive and highly significant effects of R&D intensity 
and resource-based industries across the models. These results may be interpreted as testimony to the 
importance of access to valuable resources in order to create transferable ownership advantages when 
investing abroad (Dunning, 1993, Kirca et al., 2012), irrespective of ownership. R&D intensity 
indicates that, on balance, firms that invest in building innovative capabilities may be better 
positioned to reap the benefits of international competition, as one would expect given the importance 
of firm-specific advantages in explaining FDI (Dunning, 1993). We also note that currency reserves 
seem to be negatively related to internationalization. Perhaps this reflects a macro-economic effect 
whereby high reserves increase the value of the domestic currency, making imports cheaper and 
exports more expensive. Such a shift in the terms of trade might lead firms to invest in ‘cheap’ 
acquisition opportunities overseas, and in production sites abroad.  
Robustness tests 
We conducted a series of robustness tests in order to reduce concerns about unobserved heterogeneity 
and provide additional confidence in our results. First, we used an alternative continuous measure of 
state ownership that accounted more precisely for different levels of state ownership and obtained 
empirical results consistent with our finding reported above. However, the continuous state-ownership 
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variable, derived from Thompson Ownership, had more missing values and revealed inconsistencies 
when checked against company annual reports.  
Second, we substituted some measures of the moderating theoretical constructs used in our 
hypotheses testing. For example, we used the protection of intellectual property rights in place of rule 
of law to gauge the role of formal institutions, and we found the results to be virtually identical. 
Similarly, we substituted Hofstede’s (1980; 2001) measure of power distance with other measures of 
informal institutions, including the Globe measures (House et al., 2004). Again, the results remain 
unchanged.   
Next, we used additional control variables. Since our sample of SOEs includes 36 companies from 
China and India, respectively, we included a dummy variable for each country in order to control for 
country-specific effects. The results revealed no such effects as all our hypotheses were still 
supported, suggesting that our results are not driven by SOEs from China or India. We also did an 
additional test controlling for firms listed on stock exchanges outside their home country as listed 
SOEs may use international listing as a springboard to overcome institutional constraints in order to 
secure capital for international expansion. This did not lead to substantive changes in any of the focal 
results. Moreover, we added more home country control variables, notably population as a control for 
the size of the home economy, but this did not change the focal results either.  
Finally, we conducted a robustness check by running the same models on the full sample of 5000 
firms and, again, the results remain largely robust, albeit naturally with different levels of 
significance. In that full sample, the direct effect of state-ownership was highly significant (β=-0.10, 
p<0.01) even when controlling for GDP per capita. However, as evidenced by our matched sample 
analysis, this relationship appears to be driven to a large extent by sample size and confounded by 
level of development of the home country economy. Thus, our matched sample approach allows for a 
stronger and more accurate test of our theoretical model. Together, these robustness tests lend 
additional credibility to our results and emphasize the importance of home country governance 
institutions for SOE internationalization. 
Discussion 
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Our central proposition is that the internationalization of listed SOEs depends on the institutional 
environment from which they originate. Following Williamson’s (2000) hierarchy, we distinguish 
between informal, formal and governance institutions that affect resource allocation decisions such as 
internationalization. Specifically, we have examined how home country institutions exerting control 
over decision makers in state owned firms affect the comparative internationalization levels of listed 
SOEs and POEs. Our results reveal a complex association between state ownership and 
internationalization, depending on institutions at all three levels of the hierarchy. However, despite 
this complexity, we find a parsimonious core relationship arising from our theory and confirmed by 
the empirical tests: the more that institutions provide for effective controls of decision-makers, the 
more listed SOEs pursue strategies that resemble those of private firms. 
This moderating effect of home country institutions on the degree of listed SOEs’ 
internationalization helps to explain the drivers of their internationalization. Specifically, our finding 
that informal institutions of control in form of societal norms strengthen listed SOE’s 
internationalization offers important insights into how deep-rooted cultural values may interact with 
firm ownership in determining international strategies. In line with Hypothesis 1, listed SOEs 
originating from countries with strong normative controls over elites are found to be more 
internationalized compared to their privately owned counterparts. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 2, as 
informal institutions of control increase, we find that listed SOEs internationalize more, whereas 
private firms internationalize less.   
*** Insert Figure 2 here *** 
As argued above, where unequal distribution of power is legitimate, decision makers in listed 
SOEs face fewer normative controls over their behavior, and are therefore less likely to be challenged 
when pursuing self-serving objectives. Such objectives favor allocation of resources to domestic 
activities, and hence less internationalization. However, as informal control institutions improve, this 
diversion of resources is reduced, as observed in Figure 2. At the same time, Figure 2 suggests that 
private firms reduce their level of internationalization the stronger informal controls, which is 
consistent with the argument that informal constraints on authority serve as a mechanisms to prevent 
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strategies to be driven by managerial hubris (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011). As a result, managers of 
POEs may overestimate their ability to pursue international prestige projects. While we were 
primarily interested in the difference between state and privately owned firms (the latter 
internationalizing less than the former in high power distance countries), the finding that private firms 
internationalize more in low informal institutional control (or high power distance) countries indicates 
that further research is needed into informal institutions and internationalization strategies. 
Building on the hierarchy of institutions outlined by Williamson (2000), we also find strong 
support for the importance of home country formal and governance institutions for SOE 
internationalization (Hypotheses 2 and 3). In particular, strong institutions of law enforcement and 
capital market governance propel listed SOEs toward internationalization, relative to the pattern of 
private firms. As shown in Figures 3 and 4, while a stronger rule of law and stronger governance both 
enhance the internationalization of SOEs, the effect on private firms in most cases is small – in both 
graphs the line for private firms is almost horizontal. Hence, improvements in the institutional 
environment, for example by strengthening the legal and governance systems, reduce the differences 
between these two types of firms, as we have hypothesized.  
*** Insert Figures 3 and 4 here *** 
We interpret these results as evidence that strong formal and governance institutions lead listed 
SOEs to act in ways similar to private firms, both by providing better monitoring of decision makers, 
and by enhancing firms’ ability to develop firm-specific advantages that may be exploited abroad. 
Weak home country governance institutions tend to be positively and significantly related to waste in 
government, red tape and bureaucracy in the public sector, which, as argued above, permit more rent-
seeking activities that are typically domestic in nature (Faccio, 2006; Krueger, 1990; Shleifer & 
Vishny 1994). Hence, the greater are external institutional pressures on listed SOEs, either in form of 
well enforced legislation or in terms of shareholders empowered by advanced governance systems, 
the more such firms behave like their privately owned counterparts in pursuing internationalization.   
Together, these Figures reveal a consistent pattern, along the lines we have hypothesized. High 
normative control, high regulatory control and high levels of capital market control all provide, in 
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different ways, external checks on decision-makers in listed SOEs, and thus create incentives for them 
to follow patterns that resemble those of private firms. Interestingly, the explanatory power of the 
model increases from informal to formal and to governance control (models 3, 5, and 7), supporting 
the view that governance control as the most direct mechanism is more important than informal 
control which impacts firms more indirectly.   
Implications for theory 
Our study is among the first to systematically analyze the configuration of home country institutional 
influences that provide the impetus (or hindrance) for listed SOEs to expand outward across national 
borders. It contributes to the theory of the MNE by offering explanations for why and how home 
country institutions moderate the impact of ownership on international strategies. Traditional work on 
the MNE often makes the implicit assumption that the home context has a neutral effect, and that 
internationalization is driven by firm-specific resources (Kirca et al., 2012), though resources of the 
home country have recently been recognized as a source of such firm-specific resources (Nielsen & 
Nielsen, 2010; Wan, 2005). Some scholars of specific contexts have also pointed to government 
policy may help firms mobilize resources, for example in Japan in the 1960s/1970s (Yang et al., 2009) 
and China in the 2000s (Buckley et al., 2007, Wang et al., 2012b). However, there has been little 
theorizing as to how specific home country institutions interact with different types of MNEs in 
driving internationalization strategies.  
Moreover, we focus on the internationalization of listed SOEs, a phenomenon on the rise (Bruton 
et al., 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014; UNCTAD 2014). Our analysis of the institutional conditions 
that propel or discourage SOEs from internationalizing challenges conventional theories that assume a 
profit motive underlying firms’ quest for profitable business opportunities. Specifically, we show how 
listed SOEs may be deterred from internationalizing (relative to the pattern of POEs in the same 
industry) by institutions that influence managerial incentives. In consequence, internationalization 
strategies of SOEs differ from private firms with respect to institutional drivers. Our empirical results, 
based on a unique sample of listed firms from 40 different countries, allow us to advance theory by 
establishing that listed SOE internationalization is not idiosyncratic to a specific institutional context, 
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such as China or India, but driven by some common institutional features. Specifically, listed SOEs, 
as a particular type of firms, are subject to constraints and opportunities emanating from their home 
country institutions. 
Our study also advances institutional theory (e.g., Kostova et al. 2008, Meyer et al., 2009, Peng et 
al. 2008) by focusing on the intersection of government ownership and outward FDI. Our empirical 
setting offers a unique opportunity to study the role of governments as owners across a wide variety of 
institutional settings. This approach makes at least two important contributions. First, existing studies 
have predominantly utilized institutional theory to explain home country institutional context in single 
country studies, notably China (Buckley et al., 2007; Cui & Jiang, 2012; Li et al., 2014; Wang et al., 
2012c) or India (Choudhury & Khanna, 2014). Our study extends this literature to study the influence 
of home country institutional context on firm internationalization in a comprehensive sample of 40 
countries, spanning both developing and developed economies with a wide variety of institutional and 
political configurations. As such, our study also contributes to the comparative corporate governance 
literature (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Filatotchev, et al., 2013; Wiseman, et al., 2012) by providing 
new insights into the mechanisms by which national institutions and corporate ownership interact in 
shaping business strategies.  
Second, we contribute to the discussion on how and why institutions of a country influence firms 
beyond the boundaries of the country (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Meyer & Thein, 2014). Institutions 
create incentives and constraints on strategic choices, which in turn influence firms’ drive and ability 
to invest in foreign environments rather than in their home country.   
Moreover, we are contributing to new institutional theory in economics (La Porta et al., 1997; 
Williamson, 2000; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Specifically, we are probably the first study to 
operationalize and test Williamson’s (2000) framework in a multi-country setting. From the 
perspective of this literature, internationalization is a special case of resource allocation that requires 
high levels of risk taking, and is affected by the institutional context of the firm. Specifically, our 
findings suggest that state ownership subjects firms (and their managers) to a complex set of choices 
based on both economic and political incentives. In this literature (e.g. Shleifer & Vishny, 2002), the 
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government is often perceived to maximize its political utility through its ownership in listed 
companies while expropriating the interest of minority shareholders. However, our study suggests that 
the more external institutions monitor listed SOEs, the less this is a concern.  
Limitation and future research 
The first set of limitations of our empirical study arises from the nature of the dataset. We aimed to 
study the most important firms and to cover companies from a wide variety of home countries with 
different institutional configurations; a precondition for studying home country effects. However, this 
focus on large firms implies that we have little specific to say about smaller SOEs. One might argue 
that smaller SOEs can draw on fewer state resources and are subject to local rather than national 
politics, which would moderate their internationalization behavior (Li et al., 2014). Comparing large 
and small SOEs thus would be a promising path for future research.  
By the same token, our sample includes only stock-market listed entities. While this choice was 
made in order to ensure comparability between SOEs and POEs in terms of motives for expanding 
abroad, it limits the generalizability of our results. Specifically, we cannot assess how unlisted SOEs 
may be affected by home country institutions. Future research may investigate such firms and 
compare them to both listed SOEs and unlisted privately owned firms. 
Second, our dataset is of a cross-sectional nature, relating the current internationalization to current 
ownership and institutional frameworks. This type of study always leaves open the possibility of 
reverse causality. However, we believe this to be a minor limitation in our study because our 
explanatory variables are at a higher level of aggregation than our dependent variable, and each 
individual SOE is less likely to influence the institutional context in which they all operate, at least in 
the short-to-medium term (see also Andersson, Cuervo-Cazurra & Nielsen, 2014). Even so, all listed 
SOEs in a country may together influence their institutional context in the long run. This issue could 
be addressed in future research by analyzing changes over time on the basis of panel data. We note, 
though, that since particularly informal, and, to a large extent, formal institutions are unlikely to 
change substantially within a decade or more, such a study must cover a relatively long time period in 
order to capture significant institutional changes. Panel data may also alleviate concerns regarding 
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biases due to temporary effects, such as the Global Financial Crisis, though we would expect the 
influence on internationalization of listed firms (SOEs and POEs alike) to be similar. 
Third,  the literature on the drivers of internalization has pointed to top management team 
characteristics, especially their international experience, as drivers of internationalization (Kirca et al., 
2010; Sambharya, 1996; Tan & Meyer, 2010). Since top management teams are appointed by owners 
or their representatives, as we have argued, the characteristics of the top management team are 
endogenous to the ownership structures. This however suggests that characteristics of upper echelons 
may be mediating variables between ownership and investment decisions, such as internationalization. 
Similarly, non-executive board members representing different types of owners (including 
government branches) may exert their influence on strategic decisions. Future researchers with access 
to detailed data on top management teams and boards may investigate the moderating and mediating 
effects of upper echelons.  
Finally, we find home country institutions to influence listed SOE internationalization, but the 
theoretical arguments could be extended to propose that home institutions impact on other aspects of 
lSOEs’ international strategies, in particular strategic decisions such as the location of investment or 
the mode of foreign entry (Meyer et al., 2014). Such a study would require detailed lSOE subsidiary-
level data but holds great promise for further advancing our understanding of host institutions and 
international business. Related, the outcome of internationalization for both lSOEs and POEs is 
important yet beyond the current study. Future research may extend our study by focusing on 
variation in performance related to internationalization of firms with different ownership and 
institutional profiles
6
. 
Implications for Management Practice 
Managers of MNEs around the world increasingly face new types of competitors, especially from 
emerging markets, that are state owned (UNCTAD, 2014). The prior literature might have led them to 
expect these new competitors to behave very differently than privately owned firms in their 
international strategies; perhaps driven by a mix of political and insider agendas of their owners and 
                                                          
6
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to the importance of outcomes of internationalization. 
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managers. However, to fully appreciate the motivations and strategies of an SOE, managers need to 
evaluate and understand the institutional environment of its country of origin.  
A thorough understanding of the institutional configuration of the home country may indicate the 
extent to which listed SOEs are likely to follow POE-like strategies. If the cultural traditions of a 
country support strong controls over elites, or reforms strengthen formal institutions or governance 
arrangements, then state ownership may not imply great deviation in behavior from what would occur 
under private ownership. However, where institutions do not provide adequate controls over the state 
apparatus and management, listed SOE internationalization strategies are likely to substantively differ 
from those of their privately owned counterparts. Specifically, SOEs under weak control institutions 
are likely exploit domestic opportunities, including rent seeking opportunities, and pursue foreign 
investments primarily where they can leverage their political assets. This may influence how 
managers of Western private firms can interact strategically with state owned competitors in the 
global market place. 
Beyond the scope of our empirical study, such a home country analysis may also include the 
political system and countries’ integration in supra-national arrangements. For example, in China 
SOEs are closely aligned to political agenda through a strong legitimacy of the role of the state in the 
economy and career paths that move cadres back and forth between state, state enterprise and party 
roles (Brødsgaard, 2012). On the other hand, in the European Union, competition rules enforced by 
the European Commission constrain member states from providing financial support to SOEs, which 
induce SOEs to act more like private firms with hard budget constraints.  
 
Conclusion 
Listed SOEs have emerged as major players in the global economy. Their strategies, however, are 
critically determined by the nature and quality of home country institutions. Our study of 153 listed 
SOEs, matched with 153 listed POEs, from some 40 different countries demonstrates that informal, 
formal and governance institutions of the country of origin of listed SOEs significantly affect their 
propensity to internationalize. Specifically, institutions that impose more monitoring and constraints 
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on decision makers in SOEs – namely high normative control, highly developed legal systems, and 
high levels of capital market development – reduce the home market bias of SOEs, and induce them 
to pursue internationalization more similar to private firms. Our study thus enhances the 
understanding of MNEs, of SOEs, and of the extra-territorial effects of institutions.  
Williamson’s (2000) hierarchy of institutions also allows us to consider the likely impact of policy 
changes on the internationalization of SOEs. Changes of institutions that enhance the monitoring of 
SOE decision makers likely bring SOEs behavior more in line with their private counterparts. Since 
lower levels of hierarchies are easier to change, policy makers may accelerate the development of 
local capital markets as means to address SOE behavior. Institutional reforms to improve the quality 
and functioning of legal systems may also be effective, but results may be much slower in showing. 
However, cultural factors will remain important even after reforms to the legal and governance 
systems, and may explain why apparently well designed reforms at these lower levels of the hierarchy 
do not always achieve all that is expected of them in a short time frame.  
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Figure 1: Framework of our Analysis 
 
State 
Ownership 
Formal 
institutions  
Informal 
institutions  
Governance 
institutions 
+    H2 +    H1 +   H3 
Internationalization 
Hierarchy of Institutions 
 
 
43 
 
 
Table 1: Matched Sample 
    
    
Country POE SOE Total Country POE SOE Total 
Argentina 0 1 1 Japan 25 1 26 
Australia 2 1 3 Kuwait 0 1 1 
Austria 0 1 1 Malaysia 0 3 3 
Belgium 1 2 3 Holland 1 0 1 
Bahrain 1 0 1 Norway 0 3 3 
Brazil 1 8 9 Pakistan 0 2 2 
Canada 3 0 3 Philippines 3 0 3 
Switzerland 3 2 5 Poland 0 3 3 
China 3 36 39 Portugal 1 0 1 
Germany 10 2 12 Qatar 0 2 2 
Finland 2 1 3 Russia 5 15 20 
France 4 4 8 Saudi Arabia 1 3 4 
United Kingdom 7 0 7 Singapore 1 3 4 
Greece 0 2 2 Sweden 4 1 5 
Hong Kong 2 8 10 Thailand 1 2 3 
Indonesia 2 5 7 Turkey 1 0 1 
India 4 36 40 Taiwan 3 0 3 
Ireland 0 1 1 USA 51 0 51 
Israel 2 0 2 South Africa 2 0 2 
Italy 7 2 9 UAE 0 2 2 
    
Total 153 153 306 
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 TABLE 2 
 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Variable Mean St.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Internationalization 0.13 0.21 1 
             
 
State ownership 0.5 0.5 -.18 1 
            
 
R&D intensity 0.59 1.72 .21 -.22 1 
           
 
R&D presence 0.44 0.5 .15 -.14 .39 1 
          
 
Firm size 9.13 1.51 .10 .19 -.01 -.11 1 
         
 
Product diversification 0.73 0.52 .11 .10 .05 .04 .17 1 
        
 
Firm age 45.38 40.91 .11 -.12 .13 -.05 .14 .06 1 
       
 
Industry growth 0.03 0.06 -.09 .05 .04 -.08 .04 .09 -.06 1 
      
 
Industry concentration 0.63 0.22 .09 -.12 .05 .20 -.09 -.04 -.09 -.14 1 
     
 
Resource-based industry 0.1 0.3 .05 .13 -.08 .09 .03 -.03 -.12 -.27 .23 1 
    
 
Currency reserves 685.97 898.06 -.20 .23 .06 .18 .03 .10 -.26 .11 -.03 .08 1 
   
 
Normative control 57.8 20.04 .21 -.59 .17 .14 -.09 -.03 .25 -.01 .20 -.12 -.32 1 
  
 
Regulatory control  0.69 0.93 .33 -.55 .22 .15 -.05 -.04 .27 .00 .20 -.19 -.38 .83 1 
 
 
Capital market control 103.84 80.4 .19 -.01 -.06 -.10 -.11 -.07 -.01 .01 .03 .02 -.12 -.09 .31 1  
GDP per capita 9.58 1.33 .33 -.56 .21 .12 -.09 -.02 .13 .00 .22 -.13 -.27 -.72 .83 .17 1 
 
a Currency reserves is in $ billions. 
All correlations = .11 or above are significant at p<.05
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TABLE 3 
Estimation of Tobit regressions for internationalization 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Intercept -1.14 (0.24) *** -1.19 (0.28) *** -1.15 (0.27) *** -0.66 (0.32) * -0.56 (0.32) + -1.06 (0.23) *** -1.04 (0.23) *** 
R&D intensity 0.03 (0.01) ** 0.03 (0.01) ** 0.03 (0.01) ** 0.03 (0.01) ** 0.03 (0.01) ** 0.03 (0.01) ** 0.03 (0.01) ** 
R&D presence 0.03 (0.05)   0.02 (0.05)   0.03 (0.05)   0.01 (0.05)   0.02 (0.05)   0.04 (0.05)   0.05 (0.04)   
Firm size 0.03 (0.01) * 0.04 (0.01) * 0.04 (0.01) ** 0.03 (0.01) * 0.04 (0.01) ** 0.04 (0.01) ** 0.04 (0.01) ** 
Product diversification 0.11 (0.04) ** 0.12 (0.04) ** 0.11 (0.04) ** 0.11 (0.04) ** 0.10 (0.04) ** 0.12 (0.04) ** 0.11 (0.04) ** 
Firm age 0.04 (0.05)   0.05 (0.05)   0.04 (0.05)   0.02 (0.05)   0.01 (0.05)   0.04 (0.05)   0.04 (0.05)   
Industry growth 0.06 (0.37)   0.06 (0.38)   0.09 (0.37)   0.01 (0.36)   0.04 (0.36)   0.02 (0.36)   0.05 (0.35)   
Industry concentration -0.13 (0.10)   -0.13 (0.10)   -0.10 (0.10)   -0.14 (0.10)   -0.14 (0.10)   -0.12 (0.10)   -0.11 (0.09)   
Resource-based industry 0.19 (0.07) ** 0.20 (0.07) ** 0.19 (0.07) ** 0.21 (0.07) ** 0.20 (0.07) ** 0.17 (0.07) * 0.18 (0.07) * 
Currency reserves -8.02 (2.73) *** -7.93 (2.80) ** -7.09 (2.76) * -6.51 (2.79) * -4.85 (2.81) + -7.43 (2.67) ** -7.32 (2.62) ** 
GDP per capita 0.09 (0.02) ***  0.09 (0.02) *** 0.08 (0.02) *** 0.04 (0.03)   0.03 (0.05)   0.07 (0.02) *** 0.07 (0.02) ** 
State ownership -0.05 (0.05)   -0.08 (0.05)   -0.08 (0.05)   -0.04 (0.05)   -0.06 (0.05)   -0.07 (0.05)   -0.07 (0.05)   
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Informal (normative 
control) 
 
  -0.01 (0.02)   -0.04 (0.02) * 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Informal (normative 
control) * SOE 
 
  
 
  0.58 (0.24) * 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Formal (Regulatory 
control) 
 
  
 
  
 
  0.09 (0.04) * 0.03 (0.05)   
 
  
 
  
Formal (Regulatory 
control) * SOE 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  0.14 (0.05) ** 
 
  
 
  
Governance (Capital 
market control) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  0.71 (0.23) ** -0.16 (0.38)   
Governance (Capital 
market control) * SOE 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  0.13 (0.05) ** 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
N 301   286   286   301   301   301   300   
2   87.2 *** 80.29 *** 86.08 *** 91.72 *** 98.84 *** 96.68 *** 104.43 *** 
Log-likelihood  -112.96   -107.04   -104.15   -110.7   -107.14   -108.22   -103.69   
McFadden's pseudo R2  a 0.28   0.27   0.29   0.29   0.32   0.31   0.33   
a
 McFadden's pseudo R
2 
as Tobit regression does not have an equivalent to the R-squared that is found in OLS regression.  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Note to Figures 2 to 4:  
The Figures show a linear approximation of the marginal effect. The horizontal axis 
shows the range of the explanatory variables from one standard deviation below the mean 
to one standard deviation above the mean. 
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Figure 2: Interaction of State Ownership and Normative Control 
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Figure 3: Interaction of State Ownership and Regulatory Control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Interaction of State Ownership and Capital Market Control 
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